

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-NINTH MEETING

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

MAY 11 1964

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COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 25 February 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. R.A. BUTLER

(United Kingdom)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. D. TEHOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato Abate AGEDE

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO
Mr. Manuel TELLO
Miss Ofelia REYES RETANA

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
Mrs. H. CHLOND

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. P. LIND
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. C.G. EKLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.A. BUTLER
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. J.N. HENDERSON

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.S. MacDONALD
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the one hundred and sixty-ninth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I should like to say what a pleasure it is for me to be here and, by happy coincidence, to take the Chair on my first visit. However, it is as United Kingdom Foreign Secretary that I should like to speak to this Conference, and I shall be very much obliged if you will allow me to depart from the usual custom and speak at the beginning of the meeting. There are some other speakers inscribed on my list who would then follow. I take it that that procedure is agreeable.

I should like to take the opportunity of sharing with you some of my ideas on the important subjects with which this Conference is dealing. The United Kingdom Prime Minister himself had the honour of taking part in the opening meeting in 1962, and he takes the closest interest in the proceedings here. I am very glad that I too may now become acquainted at first hand with your work.

It is no empty or conventional compliment when I say that it is an honour to lead the United Kingdom delegation, even for a short time. I am increasingly impressed by the way in which the search for disarmament is becoming a central — and almost a dominant — theme in the minds of people of all walks of life all over the world.

I personally witnessed the frustration of the years before 1939, when we worked unsuccessfully for general disarmament and yet disarmed ourselves too much to be able to deter aggression. I entered Parliament first in 1929, and I sat in this very room as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the late 1930s. I took my share of interest in the Disarmament Conference and had my share of disappointment at its failure. We cannot think too deeply on these things, and we cannot, therefore, be too much inspired to make a success now in the even more serious situation which faces us.

Now, in spite of the failure of so many negotiations on disarmament and arms control between 1946 and 1962, we have, I believe, entered a new era. I believe that today we are near to having absorbed the first lesson of the nuclear age: that nuclear war is too completely destructive to be contemplated; and that we are becoming acquainted with the second lesson: that any war between nuclear Powers can all too easily become a nuclear war.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

In parallel, we have come increasingly to understand the importance of settling disputes without resort to force, and of persuading others to do so; and we are coming to understand the important part that the United Nations or other international forces can play in keeping the peace.

Life itself — if I might borrow a phrase from Chairman Khrushchev — is teaching us a rational view of the place of war in the nuclear age. But the lesson may still be painful and dangerous. We have reached the stage at which a large-scale war is unlikely because governments will do their best to prevent it; but there is great need for us to press on to the stage when it is no longer possible for any wars, even small wars, to be waged, and when we can turn the vast human, personal and material resources now devoted to defence to improving human standards of living. It is a truism to say that one of the main problems facing any Foreign Minister today is the problem of the developed and the under-developed countries and the need to make resources available to the under-developed countries.

The work of this Conference is an important part of that necessary process. We meet now in a more hopeful atmosphere than at the opening of this Conference in 1962. We know now that progress towards disarmament need not be just an ideal, but is a practicable course of action.

As evidence of this we have the preliminary agreements in the disarmament field made during the course of 1963, to all of which this Conference made an important contribution. To this audience I need not dwell at length on the successes already achieved, but you will forgive me if as a tribute to the Conference I mention them briefly. Let me, as Cicero would have said, pass over in silence the following facts.

You did much of the work which made possible the signature of the partial nuclear test ban treaty in Moscow (ENDC/100/Rev.1). You provided the forum and created the climate for the agreement between the United States Government and the Soviet Government to establish a "hot line" between Washington and Moscow (ENDC/97). It was against the background of your discussions and suggestions that the United States Government and the Soviet Government reached the agreement — subsequently endorsed by the United Nations — which banned the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117).

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

Those are impressive achievements if seen against the context of international relations as a whole and East-West relations in particular. Of course, if you measure what has so far been achieved against the outline of what is promised in the various plans for general and complete disarmament, you can see it in a different perspective. But, even looking at the achievements of the Conference in this perspective, I am by no means discouraged.

Let us be clear that, even from our present starting-point -- which is better than that of 1962 --, agreement on the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament cannot be easily or quickly achieved. We should not be surprised about this -- and here I speak as a practical politician of long experience. Supreme national interests are at stake in the process of disarmament: interests of national security and even of national survival. Decisions on such issues cannot be taken lightly, cannot be taken quickly; and therefore we must take our time.

How do things stand today? As I have said, the climate has improved, but nations are still divided by suspicion, distrust, grave political differences, and what is known as ideological struggle. If this means no more than argument on an international scale, even heated argument, I have no objection to it. Too often, however, it seems to mean the suppression of discussion and a licence for, or even the encouragement of, certain types of warfare. Obviously that is not going to create a favourable atmosphere for rapid disarmament.

My essential point is that progress towards general and complete disarmament must, in my view, be matched by progress in other fields towards the reduction of international tension. That is why it is not likely to be a rapid process. But the very fact of international tension is of course in itself an important reason for making progress with our negotiations here and for pursuing them to a successful conclusion. Disarmament is in fact inextricably intertwined with foreign policy as a whole; and the more I see of the responsibilities of foreign policy the more I realize that,

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

Progress at Geneva is a key to success in all our other enterprises. In the same way, events outside Geneva and the general policies of all our government are a key to success in disarmament. Settlement of some of the grave and urgent problems of today, particularly those which involve a direct confrontation of the two great-Power blocs, will greatly assist progress at Geneva. I think that all nations realize this; and that is why so much work has been done on disarmament by so many statesmen in so many meeting-places.

Her Majesty's Government has thought long and seriously about our contribution. Our contribution has been impressive. It is not an empty phrase when the Queen's Speech, which sets out the Government's programme for each session of Parliament, regularly refers to disarmament as one of the first aims of our policy; and this year it stated that the Government would pursue the cause of peace with renewed confidence and vigour. We have done our utmost to bring about agreement. We shall continue to do our utmost, and when agreement is reached we shall play our full part.

When I am in Parliament in London I am often asked about a British plan; and I shall continue to answer that what we are trying to achieve is a plan acceptable to all governments.

Now I should like to outline what I think are the principles of disarmament. I think there are three essential elements:

First, that the process of disarmament should be so balanced that no nation or group of nations should be in a position to take advantage of the weakness of others;

Second, that there should be enough reliable verification of disarmament to satisfy nations that they are not endangering their right to an independent existence;

Third, in present circumstances I think it most important that the international machinery for keeping the peace should be strengthened. Dealing at first hand, as I have been doing in recent weeks, with the problem of Cyprus, I have been impressed with the urgent need for arrangements under which effective international forces could be speedily deployed and sent to any trouble-spot in the world. Moreover, in a disarmed world a fully-effective international force would be essential for the security of us all.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

Having set out these aims, I must say that the time for generalities and general speeches seems to me to be over. There is now a crying need for constructive work on practical problems. We must, so to speak, leave the platform for the laboratory. Unless we get down to work rather than words, the peoples of the whole world, who depend upon the seventeen of us, will justly feel deceived and disappointed.

I will now list a number of cardinal points upon which I think we should try to reach agreement if we are to make that practical progress which I recommend:

First, an agreement on observation posts in the NATO and Warsaw Pact areas;

Second, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty;

Third, an agreement to ban the further dissemination of nuclear weapons or knowledge;

Fourth, the increased use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;

Fifth, a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles;

Sixth, the early physical destruction of some armaments.

There are also a number of fresh proposals which I think are worthy of particular attention and study. In this connexion I am thinking of: first, an improved procedure for the Disarmament Conference; second, new proposals for verification; and third, proposals for international peace-keeping. I shall be referring to those various ideas in the course of what I have to say.

There have been encouraging gestures recently on the part of the greatest military Powers which show that a down-turn in the arms race is possible. Progress already made is stimulating new ideas and proposals.

I single out in particular the message which President Johnson sent to the Conference when it reconvened on 21 January (ENDC/120). As the British Prime Minister told the President in Washington, we warmly welcome his message and we think that it will give new impetus to the work of the Conference.

At the same time, I should also like to welcome the nine-point plan put forward by the representative of the USSR, Mr. Tsarapkin, on 28 January (ENDC/123). I trust that in this too we shall find points on which we are able to make progress.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

For its part, the United Kingdom Government thinks that important progress could be made in the first place by agreement on interim measures such as those proposed by the United States Government, which would help to reduce tension and build up international confidence for the detailed negotiations on plans for general and complete disarmament.

On other occasions the United Kingdom representatives have spoken of the preliminary measures which we think could best contribute to this end; and it is most satisfactory to me that our proposals have been so similar to those which our United States allies have put forward.

The first point, which we have long said would be a real contribution, is a system of observation posts covering the territory of members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. We think this should give each side a reassurance about the capabilities and designs of the other. We think it is a measure which could be put into effect without upsetting the delicate balance on which security depends; we think it would be an important step towards other measures of true disarmament.

Mr. Khrushchev mentioned this in July as a matter on which we might now reach agreement, and I hope he will decide that he is ready to pursue it without attaching conditions which he knows we cannot accept. Even in advance of this, there are many technical details which have to be settled before any scheme can come into effect. I think all these should be explored. It is a matter which concerns our NATO allies, and we are discussing with them proposals which might be put to the Conference. So I sincerely hope that progress can be made on this question of observation posts in the NATO and Warsaw Pact areas.

I come next to the question of a comprehensive test ban treaty. We have said that it would be logical and most desirable to follow up the partial nuclear test ban treaty with a supplementary agreement which would make it comprehensive. I hope that not too much time need pass before the very small and really quite painless degree of inspection is accepted which would allow us to have a comprehensive ban.

The next logical step is an agreement to ban the dissemination of these nuclear weapons. Both Mr. Tsarapkin in his speech (ENDC/PV.157, p.18) and President Johnson in his message have referred to this question. I am sure that this is an aim on which we are all agreed.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

I need not remind you that the so-called Irish resolution (A/RES/1665(XVI)) was approved unanimously by the United Nations in 1961. But it still remains to translate this resolution into a formal agreement. I think we should be able to do so now. I can assure my Soviet friends, as we have tried to do many times in the past, that there is nothing in the idea of a multilateral force which is in any way contrary to the principle of non-dissemination. We do not regard the multilateral force as disseminatory in the nuclear field.

The existence of a formal agreement which we had all signed would itself constitute a safeguard against a multilateral force which involved the dissemination of nuclear weapons. I hope that statement will make it easier to make progress. In human affairs there is much to be said for reaching agreement when the possibility and the will are there, instead of waiting to regret it later. That applies in regard to the important necessity of a non-dissemination agreement.

I now turn to the question of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. I regard it as particularly important that we should make progress towards ensuring that nuclear energy is used to an increasing extent for peaceful purposes. If we find that a non-dissemination agreement is not yet within our reach, such a move as this would be a valuable step towards a non-dissemination agreement.

For its part, the United Kingdom has ceased production of uranium-235 for military purposes, and military plutonium production is also being gradually brought to an end. We welcome the United States Government's proposals that the transfer of nuclear material for peaceful purposes should take place under effective international safeguards, assuming that if there were an agreement it would apply to all concerned. We welcome too the proposal that the major nuclear Powers should submit some of their peaceful nuclear activities to the same inspection as we recommend for other States. Therefore I stress -- and I have given you an example of what we are doing in my country in this direction -- that we should attempt to ensure that nuclear energy is used to an increasing extent for peaceful purposes.

I now come to the proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Perhaps this is the most important proposal of all. The Prime Minister and I said, when we were in Washington, that we welcomed the United States intention

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

that a start might be made on the problem of limiting numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The Moscow test ban Treaty was an important step towards preventing the development of newer and more deadly nuclear warheads.

These new proposals are being put forward at a stage when we all recognize that a strategically-stable balance of nuclear power has been reached, a balance which it is in the interests of all to see maintained. An agreement of the kind now suggested could put an end to the relentless search for other newer and more ingenious systems and counter-systems of nuclear delivery vehicles, a search which could, if successful, destroy the present balance. Such an agreement could also be an important step towards the down-turn of the arms race.

Again I would remind you of the vital character of the need for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Let us imagine the value, therefore, of a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which could put an end to the relentless search for newer and more ingenious systems. Let human ingenuity be devoted to more human ends.

I now come to the physical destruction of armaments. It seems to the United Kingdom Government -- and I hope that all will be able to agree on this -- that another type of measure which would most effectively pave the way for a comprehensive disarmament agreement would be one which provided for the physical destruction of some weapons, particularly the most destructive of all: nuclear delivery vehicles. Our Prime Minister has frequently urged such a step, and I should like to commend the idea to you once more.

It is for that reason that we have warmly welcomed as a preliminary measure the United States proposal for a "bomber bonfire": that is, the destruction of some aircraft on either side. We are encouraged by the interest which the Soviet Government appears to have shown in this proposal, although the extension of it to cover all bombers immediately, if that is the only meaning of the Soviet Government's counter-proposal, seems to us impractical, certainly without a great deal more progress towards disarmament in other categories and without agreement on methods of verification.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

Once the first step in destruction of weapons has been taken, we hope that other more substantial ones may follow. A second round of destruction might include other armaments, such as tanks and some at least of the more modern types of delivery vehicles -- missiles as well as bombers. That would be a very important step in advance of a disarmament treaty towards a world in which security was maintained by a balance of power at a lower, safer and less costly level than that of today.

Verified destruction might also serve to establish a useful pattern for some aspects of the first stage of the planned disarmament process. We hesitate to suggest the exact form that any destruction of weapons might take after the first preliminary "bomber bonfires". It is not the United Kingdom which possesses large stocks of the most destructive weapons.

At the same time, my Government believes that we should all look ahead to conditions that may make it possible for deterrent forces to give sufficient protection at a lower level. At such a time it may be advisable to consider how, at some stage in the disarmament process, it would be possible to counter-balance certain categories of weapons in which one side has superiority against those in which the other has a lead. Indeed, it may be necessary to think in those terms if the over-all military balance is to be maintained as the disarmament process continues. I have to say that Her Majesty's Government would, of course, wish to contribute on an appropriate scale to such a process.

The representative of the Soviet Union spoke last week about Mr. Gromyko's proposals for the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), and said that the United Kingdom has not given a clear answer (ENDC/PV.167, pp.28 et seq.). I shall attempt to give a clear answer now.

We approach disarmament in rather a different way. The Soviet suggestion that almost all the defensive nuclear armoury of our allies and of their own should be destroyed in the first stage of a disarmament treaty, which they put at only eighteen months (ENDC/2/Rev.1, part II, and Add.1), seems to us to be unrealistic. We believe that such a proposal is representational or of propaganda value rather than of disarmament value. We are convinced that realistic measures of disarmament which would build up international confidence must be taken first, before we contemplate these extreme steps. That is why we have supported the proposals for percentage reductions over a period of years (ENDC/30, Introduction, pp. 3 et seq.). They may not be perfect, but they seem

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

to us a fair, reasonable and realistic way to start.

However, the United Kingdom approach has always been to seek areas of agreement rather than to stress our disagreements. That is why at the United Nations General Assembly my Prime Minister, when he was Foreign Secretary, welcomed Mr. Gromyko's new proposals as an advance on his earlier ones and a step in the right direction (A/PV.1222, provisional, p.28-30). We think that some kind of "nuclear umbrella", as Mr. Tsarapkin so ably puts it -- it is a horrifying image but a vivid one -- is appropriate to the later phases of disarmament. We think also that we should not finally abandon this "nuclear umbrella" until such time as an effective international peace-keeping force is in existence and ready to undertake the preservation of our security. That is why I am going to talk a little later about the importance of the peace-keeping force. We think, therefore, that it would be well worth while to explore the form that this "umbrella" would take and the means by which we should reach it -- and I am sure that we should have the continued advice of the representative of the Soviet Union in this connexion. That is why the United Kingdom representatives at this Conference have asked for more particulars, in the hope that we can bring our two positions nearer together. This still seems to us to be the right way in which to proceed.

Mr. Tsarapkin has attacked the United Kingdom Government for increasing its military expenditure (ENDC/PV.167, p.31). I am the first to regret any increase in expenditure, but if Mr. Tsarapkin has read the United Kingdom Defence White Paper he will have seen just how extensive are our peace-keeping commitments all over the world -- and, if I may say so, how successful in keeping the peace they have been. The rate of our defence expenditure is one of the reasons why we have been pressing for balanced disarmament by all nations and for the establishment of international peace-keeping forces, which would progressively relieve the United Kingdom of this heavy burden. Our action in the Security Council on Cyprus (S/5543) shows exactly what I mean.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

But all this must be looked at in proportion. If Mr. Tsarapkin will compare the proportions of gross national product devoted to armaments by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, he will see that that of the Soviet Union is, we believe, about 13 per cent, that of the United States 9 per cent, and that of the United Kingdom 7 per cent. The real significance of those figures is that the United Kingdom has already cut back its expenditure as far as it safely can. For example, in 1952 its expenditure was 9.8 per cent of the gross national product, and now it is 7 per cent. I am glad that the Soviet Union proposes to make a reduction this year, but I must point out that between 1960 and 1964 the Soviet Union's defence expenditure, as itemized in its budget, has increased by about 43 per cent. In short, we should be very happy to see the Soviet Union follow our example.

I now want to make a more general observation on an important aspect of disarmament which sometimes does not receive the attention it deserves.

It may be for the great Powers, even for the greatest Powers, to take the lead in disarmament; but disarmament concerns all Powers. The seventeen countries represented at this Conference are in a sense themselves representatives of the whole world, which will, we trust, eventually sign, ratify and carry out a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

I have already said how much depends on the international atmosphere at the present time when we are still searching for preliminary agreements. I think it is obvious that tension between great blocs can frustrate the work of this Conference. It is less obvious, but no less true, that tension between other Powers greatly hinders it. Disputes between neighbours or disturbances between individual countries bring military responsibilities for others, of which we in Britain are very conscious. They can lead to renewed distrust between the East and West, which we most heartily regret. There are several countries which might well turn downwards the graph of their private arms race. I have said that we shall persevere, but I hope that all others will also be conscious of their responsibilities. In short, our aim is not only general and complete disarmament under effective international control; it is general and complete disarmament of all nations, great and small, in a peaceful world.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

Here I should like to revert to a point on which I have already touched in passing. The proceedings of this Conference cannot be isolated from the international events of our time. In his important message recently Mr. Khrushchev made proposals for the settlement of territorial disputes. The United Kingdom Prime Minister emphasized in his reply -- and I should like to draw particular attention to this -- that renunciation of force for the settlement of disputes about national frontiers does not take us far enough. We need agreements to prevent the use or threat of force in all sorts of other cases too. Above all, we need to recognize that the promotion of unrest or the subversion of authority in any territory by authorities outside that territory is a threat to peace, whether or not it involves forcible action across a frontier or boundary. We remain ready to discuss an agreement on the broader basis which I have indicated. It will certainly be easier for the United Kingdom to reduce its forces when new nations are not threatened by new imperialisms or by subversion based on out-of-date political theories.

That is the framework in which I see the work of the Conference; and I should now like to take up some of the points I referred to at the opening of my remarks.

First of all, I should like to make some suggestions concerning procedure. I think that the time has come to pass from principles and general discussion to details -- or at least that a little less time should be spent on general speeches and rather more on discussion of details. We should not look for a further proliferation of disarmament plans, which can too easily become a substitute for hard constructive work. There is no difficulty in identifying problems needing discussion; they are there for all to see in the United States outline plan (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1,2,3), with whose preparation Her Majesty's Government was closely associated and which it continues to regard as being realistic and fair in its essentials.

Whether or not that be the basis -- and that could be a question of discussion -- what I believe to be urgently needed is the hard factual examination of the measures involved in disarmament; and for this my delegation is prepared to contribute and provide working papers for the Conference and any committees or working groups it may set up. We realize that this may make a call upon manpower, and we are ready to provide that too. So I hope that as a result of these discussions it may be

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

possible to set up working groups to study factually certain problems which are agreed upon as being the most important for the immediate future. In such studies my Government will participate fully through its delegation.

One example I have in mind concerns observation posts, a matter upon which I have already spoken. Let me give you another example. One of the most troublesome problems facing us here is that of verification. It could do with further detailed study. Many hours of debate have been devoted to it here, and an enormous literature has been devoted to it by other experts on disarmament. We think that the problems of verification should be subjected to detailed study now by the Conference. Where can we find agreement in this vital field? We are agreed that with 100 per cent disarmament there should be 100 per cent inspection. Similarly we are agreed that, apart from any agreement on a comprehensive test ban or on preliminary measures, with no disarmament there will be no inspection. We are agreed that disarmament should take place in three stages. Can we not go forward from there and agree that, as disarmament advances, the degree of inspection should advance hand in hand with it?

If in addition to the preliminary measures I have been talking about we could concentrate on the first full stage of disarmament, could we not acknowledge that whatever degree of disarmament we had in that stage we should have the same degree of inspection? If we agreed on this in principle, we could then analyse how it could be put into practice. There are many possible ways of doing so, and it might be worth while to approach the problem of verification from new angles. I am making suggestions for immediate future work. It might be worth while examining what I might call a "functional" rather than a regional approach. Studies might be made of how certain key categories of armaments and certain key components of those armaments are produced and stored. Those studies might lead in turn to fresh conclusions about the type of control needed -- perhaps it would be some kind of spot or sample inspection -- to ensure that permitted production was not being exceeded. Similar checks might also give enough information about armaments already in existence, both those permitted and those which might be hidden.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

Adding the results of such studies together, we might arrive at fresh conclusions about the problem of verification as a whole. If we could at the same time achieve those conditions of increased and firmer international confidence that I have envisaged, then it might be possible to verify the first stage at least of general disarmament with a lesser degree of intrusion than we have hitherto thought necessary.

In this connexion the United Kingdom is ready to put forward suggestions for discussion in the informal working groups the establishment of which was suggested by the United Kingdom representative -- my friend, the Minister of State, Mr. Thomas -- when the Conference reconvened in January (ENDC/PV.157, pp.24 et seq.). Subjects like this are unsuitable for public debate in plenary meetings, since we are all still feeling our way on them; but it would be useful to discuss them in detail; and, of course, other representatives with more knowledge than I have may also have subjects to put forward. In this way we shall prepare for the time when political conditions on the international scene are ripe for a break-through towards comprehensive disarmament here in Geneva.

As I undertook to do in my opening remarks, I want now to refer to peace-keeping. It is still a plain fact that the use or threat of force still plays a considerable part in international affairs. To that extent general and complete disarmament is all the harder to realize. It is in my view essential to build up the peace-keeping role and capabilities of the United Nations. As the peace-keeping forces of the United Nations are built up, so the dissemination not only of nuclear weapons but of all types of arms can be brought under control.

Here in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee the United Kingdom is ready to look ahead and discuss the problems of building up international peace-keeping forces in stages II and III of disarmament. That may be for the more distant future, but in the immediate future there is much we can do to help the United Nations.

We have three principles in mind:

First, the collective responsibility of all Members to contribute to all United Nations activities, including peace-keeping operations;

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

Second, the need to take account of any excessive burden which the costs of an expensive operation might impose on the economies of the developing countries;

Third, the special responsibilities and contributions of the larger countries, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, which have to be recognized since they are in fact liable to bear a heavy financial responsibility for large peace-keeping operations.

We are also encouraging the Secretary-General to build up his headquarters staff, to digest the experiences of the Congo and other peace-keeping operations, to draw on the expertise of national forces, and thus to plan ahead.

We are very ready to discuss these ideas, or others designed to the same end, with all those who are interested. The measure of support for such peace-keeping arrangements is a good measure of the true desire of States to achieve general and complete disarmament.

I shall now sum up what I have been trying to say. My main conclusion is obvious enough: if our work at Geneva is to bear its full fruit, there must be parallel efforts outside Geneva to match disarmament with the building-up of peace-keeping forces and institutions. But there is much that can and should be done here and now. What are our main tasks for the immediate future? I believe, as I have suggested, that we must get down to detailed negotiations on the crucial problems of a general disarmament agreement. I believe that those negotiations will be helped forward if we can make progress on interim disarmament measures, including a cut-back in production of fissile material and a freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles as President Johnson has proposed, (ENDC/120), and including some preliminary destruction of weapons, as I have suggested.

Further progress must depend in part on events outside Geneva and on an improvement in general international relations, which are the context in which we must work. If, as I very much hope, this were to take place, then there would be a new atmosphere for the further negotiation of plans for general and complete disarmament. Even in such an improved atmosphere we should, of course, stand by the basic disarmament principles on which we are all agreed; but it might be possible to advance further and faster on certain key points than now seems possible.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

At the beginning of my remarks I underlined the cardinal importance of the task to which we have set our hands here, and I noted the encouragement that we could draw from the events of the past year. I should like to recall those thoughts in closing my remarks.

In negotiations such as these, for which no early end can be forecast, it is as well to remind ourselves from time to time of the ultimate objective we are seeking. There can be no doubt in anyone's mind that the objective of the Geneva Disarmament Conference is honourable and worth while. I think we can legitimately claim that we are on the right path and making progress. We must do all in our power now by more practical methods of work to ensure that our efforts will eventually be successful. I myself have been able to come here for only a short time, owing to the world problems which are crowding in upon me at the British Foreign Office; but I should like to say to you that, for what it is worth, my advice and help will always be at your service if you command.

Disarmament is so complicated and intricate a subject, and you, its negotiators, are so skilled and patient, that it sometimes looks like an interminable game of chess. But it is not chess; it is a game of life and death. If we are playing, we are playing with nuclear war. Now that these weapons exist, any war can become a nuclear war. Our task, your task, the task of all of us, is to make all war impossible by balanced disarmament. We are dealing with tools made by man for his own destruction, made on drawing-boards and in factories by the skill of our scientists and engineers.

We are faced in an intense form with an old problem of which the ancient Greeks were aware some 2,500 years ago. If I may freely translate what Sophocles said in Antigone: "In the devices of science, man has gained skills beyond all imagining, for good or evil use". But man -- said Pythagoras, the wisest of his time -- is "the measure of all things".

Ours is a high endeavour and worthy of the highest effort of man. In this Chamber, in which some of us worked for the League of Nations before the last War -- bearing in mind the failure of previous disarmament conferences and the result -- I feel it a great honour to come and at least make some suggestions, in all modesty, in the face of you who have more knowledge and expertise than I have, to try to further our important work at this Conference.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy): Mr. Chairman, first of all, on behalf of the Italian delegation I should like to welcome you to our Committee and at the same time to express to you our most sincere satisfaction at your personal participation in the work of this Conference. We all know the great prestige you enjoy in your country and abroad and your great experience in world politics. Your presence here gives more value to our work and underlines all the importance which the British Government and you personally attach to the work we are pursuing in Geneva.

My delegation has listened with great attention and keen interest to your inspired words and to the comprehensive analysis you have made of our problems. We consider your speech a most valuable and positive contribution to our debate. The active and efficient contribution of the United Kingdom Government to our work certainly does not date only from today. May I recall the co-operation which Mr. Godber, the Minister of Labour in the present Cabinet, has given to the Committee with his brilliant talent, his sense of compromise and, last but not least, his sense of humour? Your Minister of State, Mr. Thomas, and Sir Paul Mason are now carrying on his work with the same relentless determination.

I should also like to recall the particularly important role which your Government, together with the United States Government, played in the fruitful re-launching of the negotiations for the nuclear test ban. Thanks to the initiative of the United States Government and the United Kingdom Government, it was possible, after long negotiation in Geneva, to achieve the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). That agreement, as you have pointed out, has opened better prospects for further developments.

Through your intervention today, Mr. Chairman, the United Kingdom Government has clearly reaffirmed its keen desire to seek a solution in order to guarantee peace and progress through disarmament. You have declared that the Committee must now proceed to more concrete action on practical grounds. My delegation fully agrees with you. We see promising possibilities for that action on the lines you have indicated to the Committee. As you have suggested, if we could quickly agree on significant measures to reduce nuclear dangers both in the production of fissile material and in the field of strategic rockets, and if we could also start the physical destruction of some weapons, the progress thus

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

achieved would be of the greatest value. The impact of such agreements would go far beyond the object of those measures, because the international situation as a whole would be greatly improved. In fact, as you remarked, Mr. Chairman:

"Disarmament is in fact inextricably intertwined with foreign policy as a whole; ... Progress at Geneva is a key to success in all our other enterprises." (supra, pp. 7-8)

The common determination which inspires the United Kingdom Government and the Italian Government in their activities at Geneva was recently reaffirmed in the course of a meeting between yourself, Mr. Chairman, in your quality as British Foreign Secretary, and the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Saragat. Common hopes inspire the activities of the Western delegations at Geneva, whose combined efforts are aimed at improving relations between East and West and at reaching progressively the achievement of disarmament.

In your speech, Mr. Chairman, you referred to the main difficulties which lie ahead of us. Those difficulties cannot be a surprise, in view of the far-reaching character of our task; but we certainly share your confidence in the success of the Conference. Those difficulties can be overcome if our Eastern partners will give, as we hope, a positive response to our efforts. I have no doubt that in this endeavour all delegations will co-operate actively to assist the Committee. Bearing in mind our common goal, I believe that the ideas you have just expressed and the suggestions you have just made are of the greatest value, and I sincerely hope they will be put to practical use by our Conference.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, it is a great pleasure to welcome you here this morning, both as the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom and as today's Chairman of our Conference.

Your speech this morning is another important contribution which the United Kingdom has made to our work. I echo the words of the representative of Italy in praising the contributions which your representatives here have made. As far as your own remarks are concerned, we welcome them warmly, and we shall study them with great care. This morning I should like to comment on a few of the particular points which you have made.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

I was particularly glad, Mr. Chairman, of the importance you attached to the proposal for a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear vehicles (ENDC/120). As I have indicated before to our colleagues here, such a freeze would prevent the otherwise inevitable accumulation of these weapons on both sides; but, more importantly, it would halt the race to produce ever more effective offensive and defensive strategic vehicles. As you said, the freeze would put an end to the search for more ingenious devices. This search, if it is permitted to continue, might -- and well could -- destroy the present rough balance to which you referred and which now exists between the two sides.

My delegation also welcomes the announcement that the United Kingdom has ceased production of uranium-235 for military purposes and that military plutonium production is being gradually brought to an end. We also believe that this is a major step towards our objective here of reaching an effective agreement to curtail and eventually to cease the production of these deadly military explosives. The United States has also taken a major step in this direction. We hope that others will emulate this example.

I found your ideas on verification most interesting, Mr. Chairman. It is impossible to move ahead with real disarmament without dependable verification. To find a way to make verification truly dependable but not unduly burdensome is an essential ingredient of our further progress here.

We also heard with great interest your three peace-keeping principles. We agree that the efforts here in this Conference should be matched by parallel peace-keeping efforts elsewhere. As you have indicated, our goal should be to strengthen the ability of the United Nations to keep the peace -- a peace to which all our efforts are dedicated.

Mr. Chairman, we also appreciate the offer you have made of your personal advice and help in further efforts here, and I think the contribution you have made this morning indicates how useful that advice and counsel can be in our further progress. As you have also said, our endeavours here are worthy of the highest effort of man.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all, on behalf of the delegation of the Soviet Union, I should like to give you, Mr. Butler, a twofold welcome to the meeting of the Committee: to welcome you as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, and as Chairman of today's meeting.

We listened with great interest and the utmost attention to the statement you made here today, and this is quite understandable. Our interest in the statement of the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom is not only a tribute to his eloquence. It is due to the fact that the representatives sitting here would not wish to miss a single idea, or a single slightest possibility, which would enable them to advance the cause of disarmament and to take a step forward towards easing international tension. It is precisely from this point of view that we shall study today's speech by Mr. Butler with meticulous thoroughness in the hope of finding in it new ideas which would open up for us the way to agreement on measures leading to real disarmament. We should also like to hope, Mr. Butler, that your direct contact with the work of the Committee, even though a very brief one, will prove useful, and that it will help to remove the difficulties standing in the way of a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament and a relaxation of international tension, so as to move our negotiations forward. And for moving the negotiations forward both in regard to our main task -- general and complete disarmament -- and in regard to so-called partial or parallel measures, the Committee now has very favourable opportunities.

The Committee has before it the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1) submitted by the Soviet Union, together with amendments (Add.1) which have recently been introduced into it taking into account the views expressed by the Western Powers. I refer to the articles of the treaty providing for the retention by the United States of America and the Soviet Union of a strictly-limited quantity of missiles until the end of the third stage of disarmament. We maintain the point of view that disarmament must begin with such measures as would make it possible to eliminate or at least reduce decisively the threat of a nuclear missile war breaking out. That is the principal meaning of disarmament.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

There is also before the Committee the memorandum of the Soviet Government of 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123) containing a wide range of measures conducive to slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension. These measures are

1. Withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries.
2. Reduction of the total numbers of the armed forces of States.
3. Reduction of military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent.
4. Conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries.
5. Establishment of denuclearized zones.
6. Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons.
7. Measures to prevent surprise attack.
8. Elimination of bomber aircraft.
9. Prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests.

This memorandum of the Soviet Government contains proposals prepared by us with due regard to the positions and views expressed by the Western Powers. Now the situation depends only on their goodwill. If there is goodwill, it will be easy to reach agreement on any of the measures and thus avoid the stagnation which has become a characteristic feature of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, because it has not been possible to reach agreement on a single question within the framework of this Committee during the whole time of its existence.

We are, however, encouraged by the fact that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Butler, stated in his speech today that we could achieve some progress on the proposals contained in the memorandum of the Soviet Government submitted for the consideration of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. We shall remember these words of Mr. Butler and shall hopefully await some progress when the items contained in the memorandum are considered.

At present, Mr. Chairman, we should merely like to make a few preliminary comments on your views in regard to the establishment of international armed forces of the United Nations which, as we could gather, should represent an international police force. The Soviet Union has already had occasion to state its views on the question of establishing international armed forces. In the draft treaty on

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general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Government for the consideration of the Committee, due consideration has been given to the question of establishing international armed forces. The Soviet Union considers their establishment to be necessary at a certain stage of general and complete disarmament in order to protect States against possible violations of a treaty on such disarmament, against possible acts of aggression.

In accordance with this position of the Soviet Union, the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet delegation for the consideration of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament contains the proposal that the necessary contingents of police (or militia) should be made available to the Security Council by States whenever the need therefor arises (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.25). It is these contingents that should form the international armed forces called upon to protect States from possible aggressive actions on the part of violators of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. In the opinion of the Soviet side, the command of these armed forces should be formed in such a way as to preclude the possibility of these international forces being used by any particular State or group of States for aggressive purposes and to the detriment of the national independence and sovereignty of other countries. Such a command, in our opinion, should be composed of an equal number of representatives from each of the three groups of States, and decisions should be adopted by agreement among them.

It should be pointed out that the Soviet Union deems consideration of the question of establishing international armed forces to be not only possible but necessary as part of the programme of general and complete disarmament and, consequently, within the framework of that programme. It is our profound conviction, however, that the establishment of international armed forces at the present time outside the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament might give rise to great difficulties and seriously complicate the international situation.

I should like to make, in a preliminary way, a few more brief replies to the views expressed today by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Mr. Butler put forward today as a point on which agreement could be reached the question of establishing observation posts in the NATO and Warsaw Pact areas. We noticed, however, that this question of Mr. Butler's was separated from other measures. I refer to such measures as the reduction of foreign troops in the territories of States situated in Central Europe, and renunciation of the stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of the two German States. Only in conjunction with these measures can there be any value and meaning in a measure such as the establishment of observation posts in the territories of Central European States as a measure for preventing surprise attack. We should like straight away to draw Mr. Butler's attention to this aspect of the matter.

Our next reply concerns the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Apparently everyone agrees that we should come to an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons to States which do not possess them. Our Western partners are unsparing of their declarations to this effect. Unfortunately, in fact something different is going on, which we consider to be incompatible with the aforesaid declarations. We have in mind the measures being intensively undertaken by the Western Powers for the creation of a so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force.

It has become known from recent Press reports that the United Kingdom Government, whose Foreign Secretary Mr. Butler is, has decided to participate in the establishment of a surface ship, the first of a series of ships, to be included in the aforementioned NATO multilateral nuclear force. Thus the way to nuclear weapons is being cleared for West Germany. Through the multilateral nuclear force of NATO the West German Bundeswehr will come within reach of nuclear weapons and gain access to them, which is contrary to the idea of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

We cannot agree with the point of view which Mr. Butler developed before us today that a NATO multilateral nuclear force is not a disseminator of nuclear weapons. Such a point of view cannot be reconciled with the actual consequences of the participation of contingents of the West German Bundeswehr in a NATO multilateral nuclear force.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

One more remark. At today's meeting the view has also been expressed that the methods of work of the Committee should be improved. Of course we shall be glad to welcome any change in the methods of work of the Committee, provided that such a change resulted in the speediest possible and successful accomplishment by the Committee of the tasks set before it. That is precisely the consideration by which we -- that is, the Soviet delegation -- are guided when we warn against the dangers involved in attempts to lead the Committee into a maze of technical discussions before having reached agreement on the principle of the matter -- that is, on the substance of any particular proposal.

In the absence of such agreement, technical discussions would be carried on without an agreed basis of principle. For this reason such discussions would inevitably degenerate from the very beginning into endless, fruitless, and unproductive disputes on technical details, which would result in delaying the negotiations on disarmament and lead them into an impasse.

We must point out, by the way, that the reasons for the lack of progress in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by no means lie in the organizational aspect of the matter, Mr. Butler. Therefore it is not at that level that we should seek for ways to achieve positive results in the negotiations on disarmament.

Such are our brief preliminary remarks in connexion with the views expressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom. Of course, we shall not miss an opportunity of stating our views in greater detail after close study of the statement made today in the Committee by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Butler.

In conclusion I should like to give the Committee the following information. In his speech today the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom stated that in the Soviet Union 13 per cent of the annual national income is being spent on military needs. That statement surprised us very much, and we must say that it is erroneous and calls for correction on our part. In reality, the expenditure on military needs in the Soviet Union is 14.6 per cent of the annual budget and not 14.6 per cent of the national income, which, as everybody realizes, is not the same thing. If, however, we compare the proportions of the military expenditures

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of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States as earmarked in their respective budgets, we get the following picture. Here are the exact figures: out of its budget the United States spends 55 per cent on military needs, the United Kingdom 29 per cent, and the Soviet Union only 14.6 per cent.

In conclusion, I should like to welcome once more our Chairman, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Butler, and to express the hope that now that he has personally familiarized himself with the work of our Committee, as they say, "on the spot", we may be able with his assistance to find ways and means of achieving progress in the work of the Committee.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): Mr. Chairman, I should like to associate myself with the preceding speakers in welcoming you among us today. My delegation has listened with close attention to your speech, and the United Arab Republic, as a neutral country, will comment upon it later after studying it very carefully.

The resumption of our work at the sixth session of the Conference was marked by two main factors. First, there was increasing expectation on the part of the people of the world that the momentum gained after the signing of the partial test ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the ensuing declaration of intention by both the United States and the Soviet Union not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons (A/RES/1884 (XVIII); ENDC/117) would lead our work here to the achievement of more concrete and positive results. Secondly, the favourable political atmosphere was happily coupled with the declared intention and strong determination manifested at the beginning of the present session by both great Powers to do their utmost in order to fulfil the expectations of humanity for a final solution of the disarmament problem.

Under the beneficial effect of those two factors, our Committee embarked upon its work with renewed vigour. Unfortunately, however, despite the lively discussions we have had so far and the keen interest shown by all delegations, a month has elapsed without any real progress being registered. A certain feeling of uneasiness -- to say the least -- has loomed over our work in the field of general and complete disarmament and permeated also the field of collateral

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

measures, where a simple agreement on an agenda for our deliberations has proved hard to reach. That is why my delegation would have wished not only the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom but the Foreign Ministers of all member States represented on this Committee to be present here for the purpose of getting these important negotiations off the ground and helping to break the deadlock and to remove the obstacles which obstruct the progress of our work.

For those reasons also we have supported the idea of convening our Conference at the level of Foreign Ministers, whose meeting together could advance and invigorate the work of this Committee and open a firm path towards a meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the nations composing this Committee. The Foreign Minister of my country supported that idea at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly on 10 October 1963, when he stated:

"My Government, furthermore, readily agrees to the proposal of the Soviet Government that leading statesmen, at the highest level, representing the United Nations Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, should meet in the first quarter or first half of 1964 to discuss both the question of general and complete disarmament and special measures to achieve the further alleviation of international tensions." (A/PV.1236, provisional, p.57)

I should like now to turn to the question of general and complete disarmament. My delegation has listened with close attention to the statements made in the Committee on the subject. We have noticed that the two major tangible proposals before us now in the field of disarmament are:

First, the latest proposal of Mr. Gromyko (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), which accepts the idea that a certain number and type of nuclear missiles should be retained exclusively by the Soviet Union and the United States on their own territories throughout the three stages of the disarmament process -- that is, until the completion of the whole process of general and complete disarmament --, a proposal that brought the positions of the two sides closer to each other.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Second, the new United States proposal (ENDC/120) for an agreement -- as an initial measure to the disarmament process -- on a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles -- a proposal intended to contribute to halting the arms race.

In connexion with the first proposal, referred to as the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella", the delegation of the United Arab Republic stated at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly on 28 October 1963:

"If the Soviet Union and the United States have now agreed on the theory of the nuclear umbrella, there remains before the Geneva Conference the task of determining the nature, size and practicability of that nuclear umbrella; how soon to reach it; how to open or how soon to open it, how to close it and under what verification methods." (A/C.1/PV.1319, p.12)

During the course of our deliberations, the reaction of the Western States to the Soviet proposal has been to express some of their apprehensions and doubts and, at the same time, to make some inquiries about the Soviet attitude on the problems of verification, control and the desired numbers of missiles to be retained to ensure security.

The Soviet Union has given some clarification regarding certain main aspects of the "nuclear umbrella" and in particular on its functions and ultimate aim, its components, when it would be opened, when it would be closed, who would have the right to carry the umbrella, and where, in general, it should be located (ENDC/PV.163, pp.18 et seq.). Taking into account the views expressed and exchanged by the representatives of the two sides, we think that if the two parties were to engage in a more extensive exchange of views and a thoughtful analysis of the various aspects of the "nuclear umbrella" -- at an informal meeting, for example -- more clarification would be available to throw light on the possibility and feasibility of this important disarmament measure.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

While being fully aware of the full complexity of this problem, we should like to touch upon some of its aspects, hoping to provoke more useful elucidation or to narrow the gap between the positions of the two parties. The delegation of the United Arab Republic has, for instance, previously dealt with the method of reduction and elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. During the eighteenth session of the General Assembly we stated:

"There remains also a question of definition: in order to get to this umbrella stage, are reductions in surplus delivery vehicles to be made by percentage ratios or by given and agreed numbers? Not only are there technical and numerical differences involved in the choice of method, but the method of reduction also has a direct bearing on the method of control and verification." (A/C.1/PV.1319, p.12)

Both the theory of keeping a "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the disarmament process and the theory of the varied ratios of reduction, or the surtax theory, originated with Eastern and Western scientists who meet annually at the Pugwash Conference.

My delegation here in Geneva advocated the theory of varied ratios of reduction of different categories of armaments, or the surtax theory, on 20 December 1962 (ENDC/PV.95, p.17); and we are glad that in this respect our Indian colleague favoured the same idea when he said at our meeting on 18 February:

"If one side is weaker than the other in some important field of armaments, should not the percentage be varied in return for a similar variation in some other field in which the other side is stronger?" (ENDC/PV.167, p.24)

In conformity with this theory, would it be possible for both sides to agree on a certain size of "nuclear umbrella", where the numbers to be agreed upon would be less than enough to unleash a nuclear war and more than enough to guard the security of each party? In order to ensure that the existing balance would not be affected, and that in implementing such reductions there would be no advantage for either side and that security would be safeguarded during the disarmament process, would it not be of great importance, in deciding the size of the "nuclear umbrella", to consider, for instance, the strike capability in terms of power and range of every type of the retained missiles?

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

On the question of verification and control, the Soviet Union accepts control over the process of destruction of weapons but opposes inventory declarations at the outset; originally it did not accept either control over remaining levels or checking for hidden arms.

On 19 September 1963 Mr. Gromyko seemed to make another important move when he accepted verification of remaining delivery vehicles from the beginning of the second stage (A/PV.1208, provisional, p.71). Even so, differences still persist on the method of control to be applied during the first stage. This is one of the problems where, it seems to us, there are some real divergences of view and uncertainty between the two sides; and so it is our duty to give this important subject of verification all due attention, in order to remove the differences and build up confidence between the parties.

In connexion with the second tangible proposal before us: the new United States proposal on beginning the disarmament process with a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles (ENDC/120), we think it would be more useful and more helpful if the two parties engaged in an extensive exchange of views and thoughtful analyses of the various aspects of this proposal.

While I have the floor, I should like to raise a question which is of a rather urgent nature. It relates to the method of work of this Committee. During our meeting of 6 February we were informed that the two co-Chairmen were unable to reach a decision regarding a specific agenda for our deliberations on collateral disarmament measures (ENDC/PV.164, p.5). For our part, we see no insuperable difficulty so long as good faith prevails among all parties concerned. Indeed, we have before us, both in President Johnson's message to the Conference (ENDC/120) and in the Soviet Union's memorandum (ENDC/123), a great number of items in the field of collateral measures. It would serve no purpose and would be a waste of time and effort to continue discussions indefinitely on those various measures in a haphazard way, flitting from one subject to another, with no concrete steps in sight towards reaching an early agreement on any of them. Such an attitude would have been understandable at an earlier stage of our deliberations, but in this round of meetings, when we have reconvened in a more favourable atmosphere, such a situation is inexcusable.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

In the course of our deliberations both sides have underlined the importance and urgency of certain collateral measures. From a review of those deliberations it seems to me that it might be acceptable to both sides to concentrate for the time being on the following four measures, without a rigid order of priority for them and with the possibility of a mutual exchange of views on all of them: (1) non-dissemination of nuclear weapons; (2) cut-off of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons; (3) reduction of military budgets; and (4) a comprehensive test ban agreement.

The third measure would have a beneficial effect on a number of problems relating to our work here, especially those aggravating the international situation. A reduction of military budgets would lead to a considerable automatic reduction in the number of armed forces. Such a result would lead in its turn to inhibiting the use of foreign troops to maintain foreign bases, to suppress the right of self-determination of peoples, a principle embodied in the United Nations Charter, or to bypass unduly the authority of the United Nations. If I have elaborated at length on the question of the reduction of military budgets, it is only because this important measure has aroused the interest of all delegations.

In proposing this measure, together with the other three I mentioned, for inclusion in an agenda for collateral measures, we do not intend to detract in any way from the importance of the other measures. The purpose of our move is to help to overcome the difficulties we have encountered so far, which we believe are not so hard to overcome.

We hope that the two co-Chairmen will give careful consideration to those four items, along with any comment or observation which any delegation may wish to make in this regard. That is why we propose for the consideration of the Committee that an informal meeting be held to deal with the urgent problem of the agenda, and we should be very grateful if we could hear from the two co-Chairmen about any difficulties they may have encountered in the way of reaching agreement in this respect.

As we know that Mr. Foster will be leaving us very soon, I should like to appeal to the two co-Chairmen to meet once more, either today or tomorrow, and to do their best to reach agreement on the agenda in regard to collateral measures. We look forward to a report of their success to us at our next meeting.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, it is with considerable pleasure that I avail myself of this opportunity to extend a most hearty welcome to a man for whom, if I may say so, I have long had the most profound respect and admiration. It is indeed gratifying that in the thick of your numerous assignments you have found time to participate, though too briefly, in the work here. It has always been the view of my delegation that those personally charged with the responsibility of decision should show more than a cursory interest in a task of such magnitude. Therefore we welcome you, and hope that your example will be emulated by your distinguished counterparts in other countries.

However, Mr. Chairman, our gratification arises not from your presence alone, important though it be. We have noted with satisfaction that you did not come to the Committee empty-handed. We have listened with the greatest attention to your most candid, forthright and valuable statement this morning. It would not be proper for me to comment immediately on such an important statement. I shall do so in the not too distant future after giving it closer and further study. I have no doubt that our views will be conveyed to you in London, as I have been assured privately on numerous occasions by my United Kingdom colleagues that the subject of which we are seized is one that you and your Prime Minister not only attach the utmost importance to but follow closely, even on a daily basis.

However, I should like to express our satisfaction at a statement which includes an announcement of what your Government is doing to curtail the production of fissionable materials. We have noted with great interest what you said about the need for an agreement to inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the results which could flow from such an agreement.

The subject of peace-keeping is one to which we from Nigeria and from other not so great Powers attach the greatest importance. We from Nigeria, as my Prime Minister has said on innumerable occasions, believe that in the world of today the United Nations is the only solution to the problems that confront humanity. Therefore we should like to see the United Nations, with its capacity for peace-keeping strengthened, being increasingly used no matter what interest is involved.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I should like to touch briefly on a tangential subject. I refer, of course, to the reduction of military expenditure. Our views on this subject are well known, and we shall continue to insist that an agreement on this, as on other subjects, should be reached. We feel that it is a subject worthy of at least serious discussion. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I should like to extend to you once more a very hearty welcome.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I think the representative of the United Arab Republic wishes to make a further observation about his proposal for a meeting of the co-Chairmen.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the floor for the second time. I just wanted to say, as I said before, that, as Mr. Foster is leaving very soon, I should like to appeal to the Committee to ask the two co-Chairmen, if they have no objection, to meet either today or tomorrow and to give us at the next meeting the results of their talks about the agenda.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I take it that that is noted by the two co-Chairmen. In that case, if there is no further contribution any representative wishes to make, it only remains for me to obtain your approval of the communiqué.

Before putting the communiqué, I should like to express my thanks for the very generous statements made not only by the representative of Nigeria but by all of you in welcoming me here. I repeat that, if my services can be of any help to you, you have only to invite me. I feel it a great honour that you should have listened to me today and that you should have allowed me to take the Chair.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 169th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of The Rt. Hon. R.A. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Italy, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic and Nigeria.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 27 February 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.